Reference
What it detects
Three detectors run over your transcripts. All are deterministic — no model is in the loop, and a command either matches a rule or it does not. The same input gives the same output on every run.
Credentials
Credential material appearing in recorded shell commands, grouped by
fingerprint. The value is never stored or printed; id is
sha256[:8] of it, so the same secret reused two hundred times counts
once.
| Type | Priority | Shape |
|---|---|---|
| Stripe key | critical | sk_live_…, rk_live_… |
| AWS access key | critical | AKIA…, ASIA… |
| Anthropic key | critical | sk-ant-… |
| OpenAI key | critical | sk-… |
| JWT / service key | critical | eyJ….… |
| GitHub PAT | high | ghp_, gho_, ghu_, ghs_, ghr_, github_pat_ |
| Google API key | high | AIza… |
| Slack token | high | xoxb-, xoxp-, xoxa-, … |
| GitLab PAT | high | glpat-… |
| Vercel token | high | vcp_… |
| DigitalOcean | high | dop_v1_… |
| HuggingFace | high | hf_… |
Detection is pattern-based, so it will miss things. It recognises the shapes of well-known credentials. A bespoke internal token with no distinguishing shape can pass unnoticed. Treat a clean report as “nothing matched”, not as “nothing is there”.
Shell audit
Nine deterministic categories over every recorded command, tuned to roughly a 4% flag rate by deleting rules as much as adding them. Categories include destructive filesystem operations, privilege escalation, remote code execution, credential handling and network reach.
Each flagged command is shown with the permission mode in force at the time, and every denial is recorded separately.
Coach findings
Eleven findings, each with evidence, an action, and an impact estimate where one is computable. Benchmarked against your own history, so no telemetry is needed and they work with a single user.
| ID | Finding |
|---|---|
AF001 | Spend is concentrated in one project |
AF002 | Cache efficiency below your own median |
AF003 | Most agent activity is unsupervised |
AF004 | Critical credentials sit in plaintext history |
AF005 | A credential has been exposed for a long time |
AF006 | The agent is being corrected more in one project |
AF007 | Spend moved sharply week over week |
AF008 | Everything runs at premium reasoning effort |
AF009 | One ticket cost far more than your typical ticket |
AF010 | A large share of spend is not attributable to a ticket |
AF011 | Shell activity is partly invisible to the audit |
Ask why any of them fired against your data:
$ actualis --why AF004